Iraq’s Security Dilemma in the Post 2003 Era
المعضلة الأمنية في عراق ما بعد ٢٠٠٣

Keywords: Security Dilemma, Iraq, Post 2003 Era.
الكلمة المفتاحية: المعضلة الأمنية، العراق، ما بعد ٢٠٠٣

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Abstract

Today, Iraq is facing serious threats on different sectors and levels. On the basis of a number of theories within the field of political science, this research attempts to explain and analyze these threats and their eventual developments. Most important of these theories is the ‘Theory of Security Complex’ developed by Copenhagen School in Security Studies.

Copenhagen School adopts a wide approach of security based on the fact that many objects, beside political regimes and states, can be threatened and these threats can lead to destabilizing the entire country or region. These objects could be economic, societal or environmental.

Unlike the realist school in international relations, Copenhagen School adds a third level of analysis to the two levels (unit and system) which dominated the realists’ analysis under the Cold War. That is, according to Copenhagen School, the world can be divided into many regions and each of these regions differs from the others regarding the distribution of power and wealth, and then has its own security dilemma.

The regional security dilemma could be defined as a set of units (be they states or other political entities) interplaying with one another in such a manner that the security of each of them cannot be understood or analyzed apart from the security of the others. Power distribution and the patterns of amity/enmity are the main responsible variables for the dynamic of the regional security complex.
Taking into account the various threats, Iraq faces today, and the high number of domestic, regional and global actors who influence its security, Copenhagen School provides a useful theoretical framework for analyzing these threats.

The research concludes that Iraq is seriously threatened politically, militarily, economically, societally and environmentally, and these threats are caused by actors operating on domestic, regional and global levels. It is assumed that the ethnic and sectarian divisions inside the Iraqi society and the many bloody conflicts which have taken place among its ethnic groups proved that any Islamic regime cannot provide security and stability for Iraq. A secular regime is the best option for ruling the country. The real democracy which based on a parliamentary majority, not a compatible one based on power-sharing principle, is required for Iraq to resolve its conflicts.
Introduction

Iraq’s geographical location, it’s moderate climate, water resources and fertile land have made it an attractive target for many external powers both in the past and the present time. After being an independent state for around seven decades, a world coalition led by the United States of America invaded Iraq in 2003 and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein, which brutally ruled the country for around thirty-five years. During these years, the regime waged many wars both inside and outside the country. Inside Iraq, the regime waged wars against the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. Outside, the regime waged an eight-year war against Iran, invaded Kuwait, and involved in two wars, in 1991 and 2003, against two American-led coalitions. That simply means that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, has been an aggressive and threatening country.

After the collapse of regime and dissolution of its armed forces, Iraq turned into a weak country threatened by all of its neighbors, including Kuwait. The absence of effective control over the Iraqi borders was exploited by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to send hundreds of terrorists to spread terror everywhere in Iraq. Al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq succeeded in 2006 to ignite a horrible sectarian conflict between Iraq’s two biggest ethnic groups, the Shiites and the Sunnis. Hundreds of thousands from both sides have been killed in the conflict.

The terrorists’ attempts to tear Iraq culminated in June 10, 2014 when a few hundreds of fighters of the so called ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) invaded the northern city of Iraq, Mosul, and declared a state of ‘Islamic Caliphate’. A few days later, one third of Iraq’s territory was
under the control of this terrorist ‘state’. Thousands of innocent Iraqi people have been brutally killed by this ‘state’. The most brutal crime, ISIS committed was the execution of 1700 Iraqi soldiers serving at the airbase ‘Speicher’. As argued by ‘Time’, (June 15, 2014), “this massacre was designed to inflame sectarian tensions, all but demanding a response from the country’s Shiite militias in an effort to launch a sectarian war that could end up redrawing the map of the Middle East.”

For more than three years, ISIS ruled huge areas and applied severe ‘Islamic law’ on the population fallen under its control. It also put hand over oil fields and started exporting oil to Turkey for low prices. The connection between Mosul and al-Raqqa, the ISIS’ headquarter in Syria, was secured and active. Accordingly, it is so hard to believe that ISIS invasion of Iraq was not planned and applied with an essential help from domestic, regional and global powers.

Today, ISIS is so close to be totally defeated. This defeat, however, does not mean Iraq will be safe, stable and secure, at least in the short run. That is because the powers and circumstances which created and strengthened ISIS still exist. Moreover, the threats which imposed on Iraq are located on many sectors (i.e. political, military, economic, societal and environmental), and the powers or actors which contribute to destabilizing Iraq operate on three levels; domestic, regional and global. Hence, the security dilemma in today’s Iraq is not easy to resolve.

On the basis of Copenhagen School in Security Studies, which adopts a wide approach of the concept of security, this research aims at explaining and analyzing this dilemma. The main questions, this research attempts to answer are:
What are the sources of Iraq’s security dilemma in post Saddam’s era?
How do the regional and global powers influence the security of Iraq?
What can be done to have a safe, secure and stable Iraq?

1. Theoretical Framework

Like many other concepts within the field of political and social science, the concept of security has been a subject of disagreement amongst scholars occupied with this discipline. The disagreement has almost concentrated on the issue: which should or should not be regarded as security objects. Consequently, scholars of security studies have been divided into two main groups; narrower and widener. While the first group (almost realist) argues that the concept of security should be restricted to issues related to the survive of state as a political entity, the second one argues that the concept should be widened to include other issues, such as the economic, societal and environmental threats which concern humanity as whole.

Barry Buzan, an Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, was the first scholar who made a serious attempt to broaden the concept of security. In 1983, Buzan issued his book, ‘People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations’. The book was revised in 1991 and became a foundation stone for the wide concept of security. According to Buzan, the usage of concept has been affected by the competition between the camps led by the two
superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) under the Cold War which lasted for around five decades. Thus, the goal of the world’s states to survive and maximize their power restricted the usage of the concept of security to only military and political dimensions. Such a restriction, according to Buzan, ignored many serious threats, such as economic, societal and environmental, imposed on both states and societies all around the world. As a response to these threats, Buzan suggested a multidimensional approach of security to include all of the issues threatening humanity.

Unlike the realists, Buzan argues that “The security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and state’s perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. These five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other, and are woven together in a strong web of linkages” (Buzan, 1991: 19-20). Further, Buzan added a third level of analysis (regional) to those two levels adopted by the neorealists (i.e. unit- and international levels).
Based on this level of analysis, Buzan developed a theory of regional security complex (RSCT). This complex, according to Buzan, constitutes of “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1991: 190). A few years later, Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde (1998: 201) defined the security complex as: “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”. Replacing states with units in the new definition asserts that Buzan and his co-authors recognized that, in addition to states, other actors could have significant roles in shaping security complexes. These actors could be ethnic groups, economic firms, environment defenders and alike.

The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes (Buzan, 2003: 4). Further, two variables are responsible for the dynamic of the security complex; the distribution of power and the patterns of amity/enmity among the complex’s units (Buzan, 2003: 47-48). Thus, the most powerful regional states are the most influential actors in the dynamic of the regional security complex. Simultaneously, the legacy of wars, conflicts and hostilities affects the security relationships amongst the complex’s units.
The theory specifies four levels for analyzing regional security complexes;
1. Domestic level which examines the stability and domestic order of each of the region’s state.
2. State-to-state level which examines the relations which generate the region as such.
3. The regional level: region’s interaction with neighboring regions.
4. The Global level: the role of global powers in the region (the interplay between the global and regional security structures) (Buzan, 2003: 51).

Two points could be made about RSCT. First, it is so difficult to determine the geographic and political borders of a specific region. The Middle East is an example of such a problem. No one can say where the Middle East begins and where it ends. Moreover, which criteria should be adopted to determine the actors’ relation to the region, the geographic proximity or the political influence? Second, the patterns of amity/enmity cannot be an essential element or variable responsible for the dynamic of security complex. That is due to the fact that amity/enmity relation is a subject of change. The amity between Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation States (GCC) in the 1980s, for instance, turned into enmity in the 1990s. Similarly, the Iraqi-Turkish relations have witnessed periods of tension and other periods of friendship as well. Accordingly, this paper will assume that the economic interests can replace the patterns of amity/enmity as a responsible variable for the dynamic of security complex.

There are some reasons for why I chose this theory to analyze the threats imposed on Iraq after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. First at all, the security
issues in post-Saddam Iraq are political, military, societal, economic and environmental. This variety of the threats could better be analyzed on the basis of multi-sectoral approach of the security concept. Second, given that Iraq’s neighbors play a significant role in both stabilizing/destabilizing of the country, the regional level of analysis is very important to determine the external threats. Third, RSCT enables the researcher to put finger on the right security object and the right security actor and the role they play in shaping the conflict. Fourth, the theory takes into a high consideration the significant influence of the global powers in the regional and domestic conflicts all around the world. However, because of the complexity of the Iraqi national security, the research will also seek help from other theories within the field of social and political sciences to explain some of the threats imposed on the country.

On the basis of RSCT, the research will assume that Iraq’s security dilemma is a multidimensional one with many involved actors on many levels. Accordingly, this country is going to witness many violent conflicts during the next decade. These conflicts will take place on many sectors and at many levels. The research will deal with the conflicts which threaten Iraq in the next few years at three levels; domestic, regional and global.

2. The Domestic Threats

A few weeks after the fall of Baghdad in the hands of the Americans and their allies, the White House established an ‘Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance’ led by General Jay Garner. Less than a month later the office was replaced by ‘Coalition Provisional Authority’ (CPA) led by
the diplomat Paul Bremer who became the country’s chief executive authority until June 28, 2004 when he signed over limited sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government. Almost all of Iraq’s ethnic groups and political parties were represented in this government. In response to Grand Ayatullah Ali Sistani’s call for an elected government, general elections for National Assembly were held in January 2005 (Fontan, 2009: 137). This assembly was given a mandate to write the new and permanent Constitution of Iraq and organize a referendum to vote it. A second general election was held, on December 15, 2005, to elect a permanent 275-member Iraqi Council of Representatives. This election followed the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq on 15 October 2005. Two more elections were held in 2010 and 2014. All of the four elections resulted in domination of the Shi’ite parties over the parliament(1), and that was simply because the Shiites form around 60% of the population.

The threats imposed on the new regime of Iraq could, according to Copenhagen School, be ranked over five sectors; political, military, economic, societal and environmental.

2.1 Political Threats

Unlike the vast majority of the world’s democracies, the Iraqi government is not elected on the basis of the election’s results but on the basis of the ethnic diversity. Thus, the biggest the ethnic group, the biggest the power it seizes. The leading posts, such as the president, the chief of the Parliament and the Prime Minister, are shared by the biggest ethnic groups (i.e. the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds) regardless the electoral results these groups get. Since the election of 2005 till the present day, the three major posts are
shared as follows; the president of republic is Kurdish figure, the chief of the parliament is Sunni, and the Prime Minister is Shia’. Power sharing is also valid for appointing ambassadors, high ranked directors, presidents of universities and even deans of scientific institutes. This kind of power sharing leaves no room for parliamentary opposition and consequently produces a weak and corrupted political system ruled by people whose loyalty is to the parties which appoint them but not to their country. This principle, as argued by David Ghanim (2014: 4), transformed the country from a republic of fear under the old ruler into a republic of corruption under his replacement. Accordingly, it was not surprise to see many officials, including ministers and military leaders, associated with terrorist groups and organizations. The invasion of Mosul, Iraq’s second city, by only two hundred fighters of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is an example of the influence of such officials inside the state institutions.

Moreover, to make a crucial law, this law must meet the demands of the biggest ethnic groups represented in the parliament. Accordingly, many crucial laws, such as the law of Oil and Gaz, Law of General Amnesty, Law of Federal Court, are still waiting for legislating. Many other laws have been subjects of bargaining amongst the biggest parties for a long time before being legislated. This delay in the legislation of the necessary laws for rebuilding the state institutions and pave the way for stability and development makes of Iraq a disabled country.

The permanent constitution to which more than 70% of the Iraqis gave ‘YES’, suffers from many faults. In (Article 2-First), for instance, the constitution states that “Islam is the
official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation:
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution” (2).

Banning alcohol, for instance, satisfies the established provisions of Islam but contradicts the principles of democracy. Similarly, Imposing women’ veil satisfies the Islamic sharia’ but contradicts the principles of democracy. Accordingly, this article of the constitution does not work well and may cause political conflicts such as that which occurred in October 2016 regarding the law of banning alcohol. The supporters of the law argued that the ban was justified by Iraq’s constitution, which prohibits any law “contradicting Islam”. The opponents argued that the law was “an infringement on the rights of Christians and other minority groups” (3).

Another example of the constitution’s flaws could be the (Article 72- First). This article states: “The President of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of Representatives bloc with the formation of the Council of Ministers within fifteen days from the date of the election of the President of the Republic” (4). In the aftermath of the election of 2014, a deep political crisis emerged about the interpretation of the ‘largest council of Representative bloc’; Is it the coalition which gains most seats or it is the largest coalition formed after the election. These examples and many others show that the constitution represents a source of crises.
More bitter is the fact that amending the constitution is a very hard task, or as the Iraqi Lawyer Tariq Harb put it: ‘nearly impossible’\(^{(5)}\). Thus, According to (Article 142, 4\(^{th}\)), “the referendum on the amended articles shall be successful if approved by the majority of the voters, and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates”\(^{(6)}\). That simply means that the three Kurdish governorates (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok) are able to reject any amendment which is not in the favor of the Kurds. Consequently, the constitutions will always be a source of conflicts instead of being a source of stability.

\[\text{a. Military Threats}\]

With regard to the military security, Iraq is surrounded by three powerful countries (Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia). The military capabilities of each of these three countries are more developed than those of Iraq. This is because of the many wars the Iraqi army has been involved in, especially the two wars of 1991 and 2003 against the global coalitions led by the United States. Moreover, in the 1990s, the Americans carried many attacks against Iraqi military targets from which most effective was the so-called ‘Operation Desert Fox’ in 1998. The main goal of the operation was, according to the then American president Bill Clinton, to prevent Saddam Hussein from threatening his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas or biological weapons” (Kreps, 2011: 116). Moreover, the UN-imposed sanctions on any Iraqi import of arms in 1990, lasting until 2003, and Iraq lost some 30 – 40 percent of its military inventory in the Gulf War. Iraq’s military development remained crippled from 1990 to 2003, when a U.S.- and British-led coalition invaded Iraq,
destroyed much of Iraq’s remaining military forces, and caused the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Cordesman, 2004: 246). Consequently, Iraq turned from a threatening power in the region to a threatened one. Recognizing this fact, the Iraqi new rulers decided to ally with the United States and signed a so-called Strategic Agreement through which the Americans committed themselves to defend Iraq against any kind of aggression. The (Article 4.1) of this agreement states: “The Government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime”. Further, the (Article 4.4) stresses that “The Parties shall continue their efforts to cooperate to strengthen Iraq’s security capabilities including, as may be mutually agreed, on training, equipping, supporting, supplying, and establishing and upgrading logistical systems, including transportation, housing, and supplies for Iraqi Security Forces”.

The Strategic Agreement did not mention any kind of cooperation or coordination between the United States and Iraq against aggressions or attacks carried out by external regional or global powers. That could be due to the fact that the Iraqi government did not wish to provoke Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran and Syria which feel threatened because of the American military existence near to borders with Iraq.

The agreement, however, failed in ensuring security for Iraq. Thus, the American reaction to the ISIS invasion of Mosul in June 2014 was so slow and inefficient. This position
was noticed by many observers, such as the British journalist Simon Tisdall who wrote in ‘The Guardian’: “Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s tough-guy prime minister, bears much responsibility for the security collapse in Mosul and surrounding areas in the face of this week’s hard-driving Islamist military offensive. But others must take their share of the blame, including the Obama administration, which appears once again to be asleep at the wheel”\(^8\).

The American negligent position towards ISIS invasion of Mosul made many Iraqi people, including politicians, think that there was coordination between the Americans and ISIS. Iraqi MP Majid al-Ghraoui, for instance, said that “an American aircraft dropped a load of weapons and equipment to the ISIS group militants at the area of al-Dour in the province of Salahuddin. Photos were published of ISIS retrieving the weapons. The US admitted the seizure but said this was a mistake”\(^9\).

The Americans also did not react seriously to the Turkish military incursions in the Northern Iraq on the pretext of fighting the Kurdish separatist movement (PKK). Nor did they make any serious attempts to prevent Turkey from establishing military bases in the Iraqi soil. Accordingly, it is so difficult to conclude that the American military existence in Iraq or the Strategic Agreement could guarantee that Iraq may not be invaded by an external power.

b. Economic Threats

With regard to the economic security, Iraq’s economy is a revenue generating economy relying mainly on the oil export. It is dominated by the oil sector, which provides more than 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign
exchange earnings. “In 2016, oil exports averaged 3.3 million barrels per day from southern Iraq, up from 2015. Iraq’s contracts with major oil companies have the potential to further expand oil exports and revenues, but Iraq will need to make significant upgrades to its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their economic potential”\(^{(10)}\). However, relying on only oil exports puts the Iraqi economy on risk. That is because the changeable prices of this strategic commodity. The price decline of oil in 2015 had very bad consequences on the Iraqi economy as whole and on the public sector in particular. The outcomes of hundreds of thousands of people were badly affected and many of the governmental programs suspended.

Moreover, in the Kurdish area, Kurdistan Regional Government behaves as an independent state and puts full control over the processes of excavating, exporting and distributing the revenue of oil despite the fact that the Iraqi constitution (Article 111, First) states that “Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates”\(^{(11)}\). In 2014, as noted by ‘the World Factbook’, “the KRG began exporting its oil unilaterally through its own pipeline to Turkey, which Baghdad claims is illegal. In the absence of a national hydrocarbons law, the two sides have entered into four provisional oil- and revenue-sharing deals since 2009, all of which collapsed. In September 2016, the two sides began implementing a fifth ad hoc agreement to split oil exports from Baghdad-controlled fields in Kirkuk”\(^{(12)}\).

Industrial and agricultural sectors are still suffered from many problems. The absence of the foreign investments because of the terrorist attacks, the exiguous governmental support because of the military high expenditures, the
shortage of skilled labor, outdated infrastructure, insufficient essential services and most importantly the rampant corruption bring serious damages to the country’s economy. The fatal shortage of water, the immigration to large cities, and the absence of the governmental support to the formers left the agriculture in a very bad situation and turned Iraq into a huge market for the Turkish and Iranian crops. Consequently, the unemployment rate is around 16% and 23% of the population are below poverty line\(^{(13)}\). That simply means the Iraqis are economically not secure.

2.4 Societal Threats
With regard to the societal security, the Iraqi society is a heterogeneous one, constituting of many different ethnic groups amongst which many conflicts have been occurred since their coexistence in this piece of land. The vast majority of those conflicts took place between the Shiites (estimated between 55 and 60% of the population), and the Sunnis (estimated around 40% of the population)\(^{(14)}\). Many Iraqi scholars and politicians ascribe these conflicts, which cost the country millions of lives, to the American occupation of Iraq in 2003. Any glance at Iraq’s history, however, shows that the Shia’-Sunni conflict did not come to Iraq on the backs of the American tanks but on the backs of camels which came from the Arab peninsula in 655 CE. Those camels carried forces allied to Ali bin Abi Talib (598 – 661), the fourth and last of the Khulafa’-i-Rashidun (rightly guided caliphs), and the superior forces of rebel Arabs allied to the ‘mother of the believers’, Aisha, who opposed Ali’s status as Caliph on the grounds that he had not tried to find out who was responsible for his predecessor’s murder. A battle between the two groups
took place in Basra, southern Iraq, and was the first major civil war in Islam\(^{15}\). This battle which came to be known as ‘Battle of the Camel’ represented the start point in the sectarian division inside the Iraqi society. This division has been highly used by external powers to invade and rule Iraq in accordance with the colonial principle ‘Divide and Rule’. The long and hard struggle between the ‘Sunni’ Ottoman Empire and the ‘Shia’ Iran on the Iraqi soil deepened the division to an extent that Iraqis fought each other in the behalf of their neighbors.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, the British colonialists also used the sectarian division in Iraq to put their full control on the country. A similar policy of ‘divide and rule’ has been used by the former regime to suppress the uprisings of the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the south. In April 1987, for instance, Iraqi forces used poison gas against the village of Sheik Wasan in Iraqi Kurdistan; in June 1987 Iraqi war resisters were gas-bombed in southern Iraq; and on 16 March 1988 the village of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, having surrendered to Iranian forces, was gas-bombed in a merciless attack that left 5000 dead and 10,000 wounded (here the casualties were mainly civilians and included many children) (Simons, 1996: 316). The military operations of 1988 against the Kurds known as Anfal (spoils) where more than hundred thousand of people perished in a systematic ethnic cleansing program were regarded by Human Rights researchers as part of a campaign of genocide by the central government in Baghdad against the mainly Kurdish population of northern Iraq. In the context of the campaign, Iraq became the first government to use chemical weapons against its own people\(^{16}\). Similarly, the
crushing of the 1991 uprising in the south was also one of the most brutal acts of repression under the former regime. That uprising erupted after the defeat and humiliation of the Iraqi army by the global coalition led by the United States to liberate Kuwait. The regime’s security forces repressed this uprising with an endless cruelty. As described by BBC: “Some were shot in their homes and houses, others - young men especially - were rounded up from the streets and later executed en masse. Others still were gunned down by helicopter gunships piloted by Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards as they tried to flee. Women and children were among the targets of the violent crackdown. As part of the punishment, Saddam Hussein also ordered the bombing of many historical centers and Shia shrines in the south of the country. The massacres further scarred the country’s collective memory and haunt Iraq to this day as mass graves continue to be uncovered.”(17).

The fall of the totalitarian regime and the disappearance of the iron feast by which Iraq was ruled, opened a wide door for the ethnic groups to compete one another and to maximize their power in the new regime. The theory of security dilemma argues that under conditions of state failure and breakdown (approaching anarchy), all ethnic groups fear for their existence and property, and some ethnic groups mobilize for their own defense against rivals they view as threatening, including by arming, which in turn is threatening to other groups, who in turn arm, which leaves all more insecure and stimulates further mobilization and countermobilization, as in an arms race between states. Unlike a nuclear weapons arms race that may lead to stable deterrence, in ethnic conflict there are incentives for preemptive strikes justified by past
hostile relations. The ethnic conflict, according to the theory of security dilemma, is not driven by hatred, as it is argued by the theory of ‘Ancient Hatred’, but mistrust and fear. (Oberschall, 2007: 12).

Indeed, mistrust and fear could play an essential role in Iraq’s ethnic conflicts, especially that among the country’s largest groups, Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. As argued by Joseph Rudolph Jr. (2003: 155), the separation of the Kurds, for instance, would cost the Iraqi state a large part of its natural resources, especially oil. The Shiites also fear that the intended Kurdish state could be turned into an enemy to the Iraqi Arabs. This fear was expressed by the vice president, Nouri al-Maliki when he said “We do not like a new Israel in the north of Iraq”(18). With regard to the Sunnis, in the case of declaring an independent Kurdish state, the Shiites would do the same and left the Sunnis in a very poor territory on which no successful state could be established.

It is also worthy to mention that the political leaders play also a significant role in inciting the masses to violence. Thus, according to “Elite Manipulation Theory”, the political leaders who loose legitimacy in the eyes of people appeal to nationalism and sectarianism to secure power. Through the mass media, over which they have privileged control, they achieve mobilization of people around ethnic goals, and “construct” ethnic conflicts. Consequently, ethnic bloody conflicts are likely to take place at any time unless constitutional amendments are conducted to organize the relationships amongst Iraq’s ethnic entities in a democratic way far from the principles of consociationalism and power-sharing.
2.5 Environmental Threats

With regard to environmental security, Iraq is seriously threatened by the climate change. This change is manifested in high temperatures and sand and dust storms which, in turn, lead to prolonged drought and desertification. According to an article published in ‘The Economist’, August 6th, 2016: “Most of the wetlands and orchards are now desert. Iraq now averages a sand or dust-storm once every three days. Last month Basra’s temperature reached 53.9°C (129°F), a record beaten, fractionally, only by Kuwait and California’s Death Valley, and the latter figure is disputed”.

A number of reasons are behind this climate change in Iraq. Already, under the reign of Saddam Hussein, some of the regime’s policies inflicted serious damages on Iraq’s environmental security. During the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-1988) and after the uprising of fourteen Iraqi governates in the aftermath of the Gulf War II, for instance, the regime punished the people who do not showed loyalty to its policies by damaging their environment. In August 1993, Michael Wood wrote in the British daily ‘Independent’: “The encirclement and destruction of the Marsh Arabs and the annihilation of their 5,000-year-old culture have been brought about by the deliberate draining of their unique habitat - the 6,000-square-mile marshes of southern Iraq. This environmental and human disaster has been long in the planning”(19). “Huge tracts of the marshes were drained by using earth barriers to block the tributaries of the Tigris which feed the Amara marshes and by damming the Euphrates below Nasiriya”. Wood added.

The Iraqi regime’s policies, however, were not the only reason behind the environmental disasters in the region. As
noted by Ashok Swain (2004: 79). The fatal shortage in water supply in the entire Middle East and North African region turned it into driest region in the world. The population of this region constitutes around 5 per cent of the world’s people, but possesses less than 1 per cent of the world’s fresh water. The expected population growth in the region is likely to worsen the water problem further. Swain (2004: 86) also notes that the three major riparian countries of the Tigris-Euphrates (i.e. Turkey, Syria and Iraq) have rapidly growing populations and at the same time are pursuing development strategies that are heavily dependent on water resources.

The invasion of the so-called ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) in June 2014 directed the attention to the environmental damages which could be inflicted by terrorist groups. The American journal ‘Foreign Policy’ notes that “Control over water is also at the forefront of the Islamic State’s (IS) strategy of creating a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. The major dams on the Tigris and Euphrates basin are seen not only as strategic targets but also as powerful weapons of war. Water matters as much as land in this region and IS’s quest for hydrological control began in Northern Syria when it captured the old Soviet Tabqa dam in 2014, a major source of electricity and water for the country. IS has also launched repeated offensives to capture the Iraqi Mosul and Haditha dams, the two largest in the country. Considering that over 95% of Iraq’s water comes from Tigris and Euphrates, anyone controlling both dams would have a stranglehold on water and electricity supply which would have a crippling effect on food production and economic activity in central and south Iraq”(20).
Unfortunately, despite all of these warnings, the new rulers of Iraq do not pay attention to the environmental threats posed on Iraqi people, especially the inhabitants of the capital Baghdad. According to The Guardian, Pollution in the Tigris river caused by the discharge of drainage water from agricultural areas and sewage discharge near Baghdad is a major constraint to freshwater availability in Iraq,” says a recent Brookings Institute report’”(21). ‘Exploredia’ put Baghdad among the ten dirtiest cities in the world and wrote: “Located along the Tigris River, the capital of the Republic of Iraq is the second largest city in the Arab world (after Cairo, Egypt). The population of the city is over nine million. In 2012, Baghdad was listed as one of the least hospitable places to live on the planet. Among other issues, one of the biggest problems of Iraq’s capital is the poor quality of water, which leads to water-borne diseases that cause serious health problems and lead to many life losses”(22). In 2012, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) also declared that Baghdad was ranked third among the most world dirtiest capitals and the eighth capital at the level of environmental pollution(23).

On the basis of these facts it could be concluded that the vast majority of the Iraqis are not live in healthy condition and not secure against diseases and epidemics caused by pollution and other environmental disasters.

3. The Regional Threats

Iraq is surrounded by six countries, four of them (Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) are Arab, and two (Turkey and Iran) are Muslim but not Arab. The previous Iraqi regime involved in armed conflicts with Iran, Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, and had disputes with Syria for around two decades and with Jordan for a few years. Turkey was the only neighbor with which Iraq has not had serious conflicts. Iraq’s national security is highly influenced by its neighbors although this influence varies from one to another. In order to make a more precise and comprehensive analysis of the threats imposed on Iraq by its neighbors, it is necessary to deal with Iraq’s relations with each of its neighbors separately. This is the subject of this chapter.

3.1 Turkey

For decades, the Turkish policy toward Iraq rotates around three pillars; 1) the Kurdish ambitions of independence, 2) the protection of the Iraqi Turkmen and 3) balancing the Iranian power in Iraq. The present president Tayyab Recep Erdogan added a fourth pillar by declaring support for the groups which claim the representation of the Iraqi Sunnis.

With regard to the first pillar, the Turkish leaders do not tolerate the establishment of a Kurdish independent state, in Iraq or other country, under any circumstances. That is because such a state would inspire the Turkish Kurds to do the same and divide Turkey, and could turned it into a stable and effective base for the ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ or ‘Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan’ (PKK) fighters who carry out many attacks from Iraqi soil. The Turkish tough reaction regarding the Kurdish move of holding a referendum on independence scheduled for September 25, 25, 2017, shows that Ankara would never abandon its old-standing position toward this issue. In a statement made in September 13, 2017, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said: “The Kurdistan Regional
Government (Kurdistan Regional Government) should be aware that there will most certainly be a price to pay for insisting on its approach for a referendum despite all of our friendly recommendations”(24). Turkey, according to Reuters (September 19, 2017) “escalated its opposition to a Kurdish independence referendum in northern Iraq on Tuesday, training tank guns and rocket launchers across the southern border and saying the break-up of its neighbors could lead to global conflict”(25). Such statements made by high-ranked leaders raise the concerns that Turkey is ready to invade northern Iraq at the pretext of fighting the Kurds. Then a large-scale armed conflict is likely to take place and no one can predict its consequences.

A year ago, tensions between Iraq and Turkey have escalated. The reason for that tension was the presence of Turkish troops in northern Iraqi town of ‘Bashiqa’. The troops served in a camp for training Sunni Muslim and Kurdish Peshmerga units which Turkey wants to take part in the battle for Mosul(26). The Iraqi government regarded this Turkish military presence on the Iraqi soil as a clear violation to Iraq’s sovereignty and gave the Turkish government 48 hours to withdraw its troops(27). Turkey has also been against the participation of the Shia’ dominated paramilitary force ‘Popular Mobilization’ in the battle of the occupied Mosul, especially in the areas inhabited by Turkmen. Such attitudes have always been rejected by the Iraqi government and regarded as interventions in Iraq’s interior affairs.

However, the most serious danger Turkey imposed on Iraq was ISIS. In Iraq, no one makes doubt that Turkey paved the way for ISIS to invade northern Iraq and put control over around one third of its territory. In a research paper, New
York’s Columbia University claims that “predominantly Sunni Muslim Turkey has covertly supplied, trained, financed and assisted the recruitment of ISIS’ Sunni fighters in their battles with the Kurds, with Iraq’s Shia-led government, and with the Syrian government, which Turkey opposes”(28). The Guardian also wrote that “Some of the accusations, such as the government’s direct arming of ISIS, seem far-fetched. But other claims, including suggestions that Turkish middlemen were involved in lucrative ISIS oil smuggling from Iraq to Turkey, are widely believed”(29). Backing groups and figures opposing to the Iraqi government, and hosting their conferences and meeting in Istanbul and Ankara is also an evidence that Turkey does not desire to see stable and peaceful Iraq.

The threats of Turkey, however, are not restricted to political and military issues. The Turkish water projects represent a serious threat to Iraq’s agriculture and environment. Between 1923 and 1950, Turkey constructed three dams, in the 1950s six more, but by the mid-1990s it housed 140 dams. After China, Turkey was second on the list of countries in building large numbers of big dams (higher than ten meters) in the 1990s (Swain, 2004: 86). These dams deprived Iraq of huge quantities of water supply from both Tigris and Euphrates.

Nearly for a half century, “Turkey has been building its huge Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP). The project will eventually include 19 hydroelectric power stations and 22 dams, built across both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. By diverting their waters, the Turks intend to bring 1.7 million hectares of new land under cultivation, and to double the country’s energy production. This hugely ambitious
development scheme has been funded, to the tune of $32 billion, by Turkey itself. The Turks had to go it alone because the World Bank, normally keen to support such major infrastructure projects, made the highly unusual decision to refuse Turkey assistance for the GAP. This was on the grounds that the project would harm the interests of Turkey’s downstream neighbours Syria and Iraq, and could therefore destabilize the region”. According to Swain (2004: 88), “With the full operation of GAP, the flow of the Euphrates to Syria could be reduced by up to 40 per cent and to Iraq by up to 80 per cent”.

What makes things worse, however, is the belief of the Turkish leaders that Tigris and Euphrates are Turkish rivers so long they flow out from Turkish soil, and then only the Turks have the right of full control over their water supply. In 1992, the then Turkey’s Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, argued: “Water resources are Turkey’s and oil is theirs (Syria’s and Iraq’s). Since we do not tell them, “Look, we have a right to half your oil”, they cannot claim to what is ours”. Such an argument paves the way for aggressive water policies which put Iraq’s demand for water under the mercy of Turkish leaders. One can conclude that today’s Turkey becomes a source of serious political, military, economic, societal and environmental threats for Iraq instead of being a source of stability and development.

3.2 Iran

There is no doubt that the Iranians welcomed the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, but at the same time they did not like to see tens of thousands of American troops encamping near their western border. The Iranians felt happy to the removal of the Iraqi regime because of the Iraqi-
Iran war which lasted for eight years and cost Iran hundreds of thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars. Simultaneously, the American troops concerned the Iranians who have had a long period of hostility with the United States. Consequently, the Iranian policy toward the new Iraq aimed at achieving two main goals; 1) to make the Americans leave Iraq as soon as possible, and 2) to ensure that the new Iraqi regime is close to them and will never wage or allow waging war against the Islamic republic.

In order to achieve the first goal, the Iranians made serious efforts to support the Iraqi armed resistances to the American occupation. Paradoxically, the Shia’ Iran gave hand even to the extremist Sunni groups who fought the American forces in Iraq. This fact was confirmed by many sources. The Washington Time, for example, wrote: “Support from Shiite Iran for non-Shiite terror groups is hardly unprecedented: Tehran has a history of strategically supporting Sunni terrorists that share the Islamic Republic’s objectives of attacking Israel (such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or those who attack the “far enemy” of the United States, such as al Qaeda. Iran also played an important role in supporting al Qaeda in Iraq, the progenitor of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan noted in their 2015 book “ISIS: Insider the Army of Terror” al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) head Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was “based in Iran and northern Iraq” for “about a year” after fleeing Afghanistan following the arrival of U.S.-led coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. After a brief arrest by Iranian authorities, he was allowed to “move freely” throughout the region to recruit for the Iraqi
terrorist antecedent to what would eventually morph into the global threat that ISIS is today”(32).

With regard to the second goal the Iranians always support the Shia’ parties and play a significant role in gathering these parties in a unified coalition in order to ensure parliamentary majority and then form a Shia’ dominated government. This Iranian crucial role in the formation of the Iraqi governments strengthens the sectarian polarity and weakens the democratic principles of ruling the state. It also encourages many of Iraqi politicians to show more loyalty to Iran than to Iraq. Thus, it was not surprise to see the Shi'ite leaders compete with each other to satisfy Teheran and meet its demands at the expense of the national interest. No Iraqi government, for instance, since the fall of the Baathist regime till the present day, has required an amendment to the Iraqi-Iranian agreement of 1975 in which Iraq agreed to move the maritime boundary between the two countries to the thalweg conditioned on Iran’s withdrawal of support for the Iraqi Kurds(33).

The Iranian policy toward Iraq, however, changed dramatically after the ISIS’ invasion of northern Iraq and the declaration of the so-called Islamic Caliphate. In contrast to many regional powers, Iran allied with the Iraqi government in fighting ISIS and put an end to its Caliphate. The Iranian powerful elite force ‘al-Quds’ led by general Qassem Suleimani, played a crucial role in coordinating with the various Shia’ militias which are braced to defend Baghdad after ISIS seized the key city of Ramadi(34). This Iranian position was motivated by a number of factors. First and foremost, the Iranian leaders regarded ISIS and its state as an American creation aiming at destabilizing the region and
threatening Iran’s national security. Second, the collapse of the Shia’ dominated government in Baghdad would resulted in anti-Iranian rule. Third, ISIS represented a serious threat to Iran’s closest regional allies; Syria and Hezbollah. Fourth, ISIS domination over an Iraqi huge territory would change the balance of power between Iran and Turkey for the favor of the later. However, regardless the reasons behind the Iranian support for the Iraqi forces in the battle against ISIS, this support was of a high significance for Iraq to defeat ISIS.

Today, beside the Iraqi army there are many paramilitary groups backed by Iran. “Current estimates of the total Shiite militiamen in Iraq number about 110,000-120,000, including the long-standing Iran-backed militias (about 80,000, according to U.S. officials), as well as the approximately 40,000 men who joined to fight alongside the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) against the Islamic State. Collectively, all of the Shiite militias are known as Popular Mobilization Forces or Units (PMFs or PMUs). In addition to receiving Iraqi government funds, the PMFs reportedly receive funds from Iran and from various parastatal organizations in Iran”(35). These groups might complicate the longer-term effort to appease and stabilize Iraq, and delay the transformation of the country from a militarized society into to a civil one. The Iranian tendency of exporting its Islamic model of ‘vilayet faqih’ to Iraq makes many Iraqis worry about their new democracy.

Like Turkey, Iran also follows a destructive water policy toward Iraq. On the basis of a study made by Martin Chulov, Adam Abramson (2015) noticed that “Iran has taken steps to divert key water supplies away from Iraq and back down into Iranian territory. It began to divert their Karun river back
into their own country and prevented that much needed flow of water from entering the eastern regions of Iraq. “There is trouble, too, from Iran, whose government earlier this year ordered the diversion back into Iranian territory of a key tributary of the Tigris, the Karun River, which enters Iraq just north of the southern city of Basra. This divergence of the water flow is a further illustration of how Iran’s realist foreign policy is enacted regarding the Republic of Iraq”. These facts provide a very strong evidence that neither the ‘Sunni’ Turkey, nor the ‘Shia’ Iran take into consideration the suffering of the Iraqi people.

3.3 Saudi Arabia

Because of the threats Saddam Hussein’s regime posed on the Saudi Arabia, the Saudis were happy for the fall of that regime, but they were not happy to see it replaced by a Shia’ and pro-Iranian regime. Such a regime, according to the Saudis, could provoke the Saudi Shiites to revolt against the Wahhabi regime which denies many of their rights as a sect. Moreover, the Saudis fear a sectarian-based alliance between Iran and Iraq. Such an alliance would shift the balance of power in the region and impose serious threats to the Gulf States, particularly the Saudi Arabia. This fear was clearly expressed by the former Saudi minister for foreign affairs, Saud al-Faisal, in 2005, when he told the Americans: “We have fought together to save Iraq from Iranian control, but the United States has handed it on a golden plate to Iran.”(36).

The Saudi leaders, like other leaders of Gulf Cooperation Council states, also feared that Iraq’s new democracy could be an attractive process to the repressed people of their kingdom, and then the ‘Domino Effect’ of the
Iraqi democracy move to the south. Mustafa Alani, the Senior Advisor and the Director of the National Security and Terrorism Studies Department at the Gulf Research Center, told Reuters. “If the Shiites of Iraq can come to power, Shia’s next door in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait feel why they cannot they do the same”(37). Accordingly, the Saudis attempted, from the very beginning of the Iraqi change, to prevent any external consequences of the democratic process in Iraq.

The Saudis found in the sectarian division inside the Iraqi society a great opportunity to intervene in the Iraqi affairs and destabilize the entire country. On the pretext of defending Iraqi Sunnis and resisting the occupiers, the Saudi Arabia involved intensively in Iraq’s sectarian conflict. In November of 2004, for instance, twenty-six clerics, most of whom held positions as lecturers of Islamic studies at various Saudi state-funded universities, issued a call for jihad against American forces in Iraq. Two Saudi officials denounced the fatwa in interviews with the Western media, but no retraction was made in Arabic to local media outlets. Months later, a Saudi dissident group released a videotape showing the Chief Justice of Saudi Arabia’s Supreme Judicial Council, Saleh bin Muhammad al-Luhaidan, advising young Saudis at a government mosque on how to infiltrate Iraq and fight US troops, as well as assuring them that Saudi security forces would not punish them after their return. While Luhaidan publicly retracted his statements, videotapes of prominent Saudi clerics exhorting the public to wage jihad in Iraq and elsewhere continue to surface (Whehery, 2009: 2). In December 2006, a high-ranking cleric close to the Saudi royal family, Abdul Rahman al-Barak, denounced Shiites as an
“evil sect ... more dangerous than Jews and Christians”. Given that in Saudi Arabia, the religious institution is strongly linked to the government, one can easy conclude that the Saudi clerics expressed the kingdom’s official attitude towards Iraq. This Saudi policy gave incentive to the U.S. adviser in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, to describe Saudi Arabia as “an engine of jihad” (38).

The Saudi interventions in Iraq’s interior affairs did not suspend after the invasion of ISIS. All of the attempts made by the Iraqi governments to approve the relationship with Saudi Arabia did not succeed in putting an end to the Saudi interventions in spite of exchanging ambassadors. In August 2016, for instance, Iraq asked Saudi Arabia to replace its ambassador in Baghdad, Thamer al-Sabhan, after he said that Iranian-backed Shia paramilitary units were aggravating tensions with Sunni Muslims in Iraq (39).

Today, due to the deep crisis between the Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Saudis seem to rethink their relationships with the region’s states, especially Iraq. No one, however, can guarantee that Saudi Arabia will suspend its support to the terrorist groups operating in Iraq. Nor can anyone guarantee that Saudi Arabia, under the rule of Saudi royal family, could turn into one of Iraq’s friends.

4. The global Threats

It is hard to say that the new Iraq is directly threatened by global powers. The absence of direct threats is attributed to the fact that Iraq is not surrounded by any global power. Nor does Iraq involve in conflicts or disputes with global powers. Moreover, the American military presence in the country, and the strategic pact with the United States could
ensure that Iraq would never be attacked by one or another global power. However, bringing to mind the words of the British statesman Henry Palmerston (1784-1865): “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual”, and the words of the veteran U.S. diplomat Henry Kissinger: “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”(40), it will not be a surprise to witness a divorce between Iraq and the United States.

As mentioned above, the Americans were not serious in preventing the fighters of ISIS from crossing the Iraqi northern borders in June 2014. Nor were they serious in resisting their expansion inside the Iraqi soil, or liberating the territories they occupied. In contrary, many reports talked about secret cooperation between the U.S. forces and ISIS in sometimes and specific areas. This American carelessness in defending Iraq, with which they signed a strategic pact, turned the United States into a source of threat instead of being a source of security.

It is also worthy to note that the United States and its Central Agency of Intelligence (CIA) had a long history of plotting conspiracies against the regimes they do not like. In 1953, for instance, the Americans made great efforts to remove the Iranian popular government of Mohammad Mosaddeq from power and restore their ally, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, instead of him(41). The American-backed coup against the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende, in 1973 is another example of the U.S. conspiracies against the undesired regimes(42).

In today’s Iraq, though there is no room for military coups, there is a wide room for political conspiracies to form
governments. Since the parliamentary elections of December 2005 till the last elections of 2014, the election of the prime ministers who led the governments has not been based only on the electoral results they got but also on the desires of some regional and global powers, especially Iran and the United States. The election of the current prime minister, Dr. Haidar al-Obadi, for instance, is an example of violating democratic principles for achieving political ends. Thus, the Americans supported the candidature of Dr. al-Obadi who got less than four thousand votes at the expense of Nuri al-Maliki who got more than 700 thousand votes because the White House did not like al-Maliki as a political partner. Ranj Alaaldin, an Iraqi specialist and visiting scholar at Columbia University, stressed that the Americans backed Dr. Abadi because “he is seen as a moderate within the Da’wa party, and has shown more of willingness to compromise than his predecessor”\(^{(43)}\).

The American interventions in the formation of the Iraqi governments in accordance with their interests threaten Iraq’s national security and make the Iraqi leaders more loyal to Washington than to Baghdad. In the long run, such a situation would put the fate of the country in the hands of the Americans, and inflict a serious damage on Iraq’s democracy.

5. Conclusion

As shown above, the threats met by Iraq after 2003 are located on many sectors (political, military, economic, societal and environmental), and at three levels (domestic, regional and global). At the domestic level, the so-called political process which begun after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime suffers from many flaws. The most dangerous one is the principle of power-sharing which is
followed by the country’s biggest political parties to share key posts on ethnic and sectarian bases. Accordingly, many of Iraq’s new leaders lack competency, and their loyalty is directed to their parties instead of their people. Moreover, this principle leaves no room for political opposition, and then no real authority can check after the performance of the government.

The absence of real parliamentary opposition results in what came to be known ‘compatible democracy’, a democracy based on an accord among the political parties instead of the parliamentary majority. Consequently, many of important laws could not be legislated because of the absence of accord among the partners. The political process, therefore, can hardly result in a modern, stable and developed state unless the principles of ‘power-sharing’ and ‘compatible democracy’ replaced by ‘government of a parliamentary majority’ and ‘real democracy’ based on the votes of people instead of the ethnic division.

The permanent constitution of Iraq also suffers from many flaws. Many of its articles are ambiguous and contradict one another. It attempts unhopefully to accord Islam with democracy. Accordingly, it could be interpreted in many different ways and then be a source of disputes and conflicts among the country’s parties and ethnic groups. That is why, to have a stable political system, it is necessary to find a way by which this constitution could be amended to avoid conflicts and disputes.

With regard to Iraq’s military security, the Iraqi army is not able to balance the power of its neighbors, especially Turkey and Iran. Moreover, the Kurdish Peshmerga is regarded as a part of the Iraqi army despite the fact that the
loyalty of this force is to the leaders of Kurdistan Regional Government but not the united Iraq. The many paramilitary groups and militias could also turn into sources of conflicts at any time.

With regard to the societal security, Iraq is not secure. The long periods of the sectarian confrontations showed that ethnic division in the Iraqi society could at any time exploit to inflict damage on the political process. The referendum on the independence of Kurdistan which was hold on September 25 and its result showed that a large-scale confrontation among Iraq’s different ethnic group is not excluded. Taking these facts into consideration, secularism is the best option for Iraq. Iraq also faces serious economic and environmental threats because of the climate change and the aggressive water policies followed by Turkey and Iran. Drought and desertification are going to deprive Iraq of huge agricultural areas. The Iraqi government must give a high priority to the shortage of water supply.

At the regional level, almost all of Iraq’s neighbors intervene in its interior affairs and exploit the ethnic divisions inside its society to have influence on its politics. The fear of the new Iraqi democracy makes the neighbor countries doing everything possible to stop the effect of Iraq’s ‘domino’. Despite the remarkable triumph of the Iraqi forces in the battle against ISIS, one cannot be completely convinced that the neighboring countries are going to give up their interventions in Iraq’s interior affairs. So, the threats still exist.

At the global level, no real threats to Iraq’s new regime and democracy. That is because no global power has a conflict or disputes with Iraq. Moreover, the U.S.- Iraqi
strategic pact provide, to some extent, an effective protection to Iraq. However, the American interventions in the formation of the Iraqi governments raise serious concerns about the sovereignty and independence of the country.

In short, Iraq is a threatened country and just its people have the ability to make it safe, stable and developed.
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المعضلة الأمنية في عراق ما بعد 2003
م. د. سامي أحمد صالح كلاوي
كلية القانون – الجامعة العراقية

ملخص البحث

يتعرض العراق اليوم إلى تهديدات في غاية الخطورة وعلى أصعدة ومستويات مختلفة. وبالاستناد إلى عدة نظريات في حقل العلوم السياسية، أهمها نظرية المعضلة الأمنية الإقليمية، يحاول هذا البحث الوقوف على منابع تلك التهديدات ومساراتها وإمكانية الحد من خطرتها. وتميز تلك النظرية التي تنسب إلى "مدرسة كوبنهاكن في الدراسات الأمنية" بتبنيها مفهوماً موسعًا لمصطلح الأمن يختلف عن المفهوم "الواقعي" الذي كان سائداً في فترة الحرب الباردة، والذي يضع جل تركيزه على الجانبين العسكري والسياسي ويهم الجوانب الأخرى التي تهدد الدول والمجتمعات البشرية. فمع اعترافها بالأهمية القصوى للجانبين العسكري والسياسي، ترى مدرسة كوبنهاكن أن الدول والشعوب تتعرض إلى أخطار اقتصادية واجتماعية وبينية قد تودي إلى الهلاك إن لم تأخذ بالحسبان. كما يتميز النظرية بإضافة مستوى ثالث للتحليل (وهو المستوى الإقليمي) إلى المستويين الذين تتناولهما المدرسة الواقعية الجديدة وهما مستوى الدولة والمستوى العالمي. وتقوى "مدرسة كوبنهاكن" أنه بالإمكان تقسيم العالم إلى أقاليم وكل إقليم منها معضلة أمنية تختلف في حجمها وشدة ممكنة من مكان لآخر. وتعرف المدرسة "المعضلة الأمنية" بأنها مجموعة من الوحدات (دول كانت أو كيانات سياسية أخرى) تتداخل أمنياً مع بعضها البعض على نحو يجعل من دراسة أمن إحداها بمفعل أن الأقليم في غاية الصعوبة إن لم يكن مستحيلاً. وتفترض المدرسة أن القدرات التي تتمتع بها دول الإقليم ونماذج الصداقة والعداء السائدة بينهما هي العاملان الأساسيان في تحديد مسارات المعضلة وآفاق تطوراتها.
والنظر للتنوع الكبير في التهديدات (السياسية والعسكرية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية والبيئية) التي تواجه العراق منذ سقوط بغداد في عام 2003 وحتى اليوم، أجد أن تبني المفهوم الواسع للأمن يصبح أكثر من غيره في رسم صورة واضحة ودقيقة لتلك التهديدات. كما أن اعتبار العراق جزءاً من معضلة أمنية إقليمية يساعد إلى حد كبير في تحليل ما يتعرض له البلد من تهديدات على المستوى الإقليمي إضافة إلى المستوى العالمي. فقد أسسي العراق ساحة لتصفية حسابات إقليمية وغرضها لتجاذبات دولية انقصت الكثير من مبادئه واستقلاله.

ويفترض البحث أن الانقسامات الإثنية للمجتمع العراقي (وخصوصاً الطائفية منها) وما خلفته من دماء غزيرة تجعل من النظام الإسلامي نموذجاً عاجزاً عن النهوض بمهام التحرر والبناء. وعلى ذلك، فإن نظام الحكم العلماني القائم على مبادئ الديمقراطية الحقيقية، ليست التوافقية، هو أفضل النماذج المتاحة في هذه المرحلة.

وعلى الصعيد الإقليمي، يفترض البحث أن الاتحاد عن سياسة المحاور وعدم الدخول في سياق تسلح مع أي طرف إقليمي هو أكثر السبل فعالية في ضمان استقرار أمني ونمو اقتصادي ووجه مجتمعي. أما على الصعيد العالمي، فيفترض البحث أن تعزيز العلاقات مع الدول العظمى على أساس المصالح المشتركة كفيل بإبعاد شبح الحروب عن العراق وتعزيز مكانه على المستوى العالمي.